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The Eurozone crisis has increased soft Euroscepticism in
Greece, where Greeks wish to remain in the euro, but no
longer trust the EU.
by Blog Admin
Nearly six years of recession have taken their toll on Greece, and the country is now facing
difficult austerity measures from the EU, the IMF, and the European Central Bank. But what
has austerity meant for Euroscepticism in the country? Using Eurobarometer statistics, Kyriaki
Nanou and Susannah Verney find that while there is now a deep distrust of the EU and its
institutions on the part of the Greek people, there is little appetite for the country to exit the EU
or leave the euro.
An important consequence of  the eurozone crisis has been a rise in Euroscepticism across
Europe, weakening the legit imacy of  the integration process and undermining the polit ical
representation of  the cit izens in the member states. Just how extensive has the increase in
euroscepticism been and what are its implications f or the f uture of  European integration? In
investigating these questions, Greece of f ers a particularly interesting case. Greece, at the
centre of  the crisis, has been deeply af f ected by a recession entering its sixth year, with the
total decline in GDP expected to exceed 25 per cent bef ore the end of  2013. The crisis has
caused much polit ical controversy, electoral volatility and civil strif e, af f ecting polit ical
parties, voting behaviour and governing institutions. The agreement of  joint IMF-EU rescue packages in
May 2010 and July 2011 were accompanied by austerity measures and recurrent speculation about a
‘Grexit ’. Bef ore the crisis, Euroscepticism was a minority viewpoint in Greek public opinion. Consistent
majorit ies of  Greek cit izens and the mainstream parties, f rom the late 1980s onwards, have been amongst
the strongest supporters of  the integration process, recognising the social, polit ical and economic benef its
of  membership.
Public opinion data f rom the Eurobarometer surveys show that the crisis caused many supporters of  the
EU project to become crit ics or even sceptics.  Figure 1 shows the evolution of  the views of  Greek cit izens
between 2003-12, using a series of  long-standing Eurobarometer indicators showing negative evaluations
towards the EU and the integration process. While there was a small and gradual increase in
Euroscepticism during the early 2000s, ref lecting an EU-wide trend, the f igure reveals a striking rise in
negative sentiment during the crisis.
Figure 1: Indicators of att itudes towards the European Union (negative responses)
Source: Eurobarometer surveys.
As Figure 1 shows, it was not the outbreak of  the global f inancial crisis which triggered the change. Instead,
the turning point came immediately af ter autumn 2009, with the onset of  the Greek sovereign debt crisis
when the newly elected Socialist government admitted that the country’s of f icial economic statistics had
been misreported. Revised f igures revealed the grim state of  the Greek economy with a very high def icit
and public debt. From this point onwards, as the eurozone’s init ial hesitation to intervene in Greece was
f ollowed by an EU/IMF bailout delivering harsh austerity measures, the f ive indicators of  negative sentiment
towards the EU f ollow parallel upward paths.
In a period of  three years, the proportion of  Greek respondents holding a negative image of  the EU almost
tripled (f rom 14 per cent in November 2009 to 49 percent in November 2012), while those tending not to
trust the EU and those believing the EU was going in the wrong direction more than doubled (f rom 38 per
cent to 81 per cent and f rom 31 per cent to 74 per cent, respectively). For the latter two indicators, the
overwhelming majority now held a negative stance. Those viewing EU membership as ‘a bad thing’ jumped
f rom 13 to 33 per cent in Spring 2011, which is the last t ime this question was included in the
Eurobarometer surveys, but showed a notable drop at 19%, based on a survey conducted by the European
Parliament in spring 2012. In spring 2011, this made Greece the EU member-state with the highest
proportion of  respondents giving a negative answer, marginally ahead of  the tradit ionally Eurosceptic UK.
Meanwhile, between November 2009 and May 2011, those Greek cit izens who considered the country had
not benef ited f rom membership doubled f rom 25 to 50 per cent, the second highest proportion in the EU
(this t ime behind the UK).
The speed and extent of  the Greek opinion shif ts are startling. This change in att itudes reveals that there
is a potential message to send to polit ical elites in Greece and Europe. The increase in negative attitudes
towards the EU could ref lect a crisis of  “output legit imacy” and the f act that the EU can no longer
guarantee prosperity and growth f or its cit izens. It could also ref lect a crisis of  “input legit imacy” and the
realisation of  the irreversible impact of  the process of  integration on decisions that touch the most
important polit ical issues f or ordinary voters such as growth and job creation. Citizens in Greece have
become increasingly aware that they can no longer inf luence public policy through tradit ional f orms of
polit ical participation, such as voting in national elections. The realisation that the EU matters a lot could
trigger a posit ive process whereby cit izens demand to become more actively involved in debates on the
f uture of  the integration process, the content of  EU policies, their ideological direction and their impact on
questions of  equity and solidarity within their societies. Several of  the indicators cited above can be
regarded as measuring sof t Euroscepticism, entailing opposition to the current direction of  integration or
the content of  key policies. Unlike hard Euroscepticism, the sof t variety does not challenge either the
principle of  European integration or national membership. In May 2011, while almost three-quarters of  the
Greek sample agreed the EU was going in the wrong direction, an indicator of  crit icism rather than
scepticism, only one-third concurred with the statement that EU membership was ‘a bad thing’, a hard
Eurosceptic response.
Perhaps what is more disconcerting is that the proportion of  cit izens that expressed distrust in EU
institutions reached 81% in autumn 2012, a huge increase f rom 30% in autumn 2003. This is particularly
worrying since negative attitudes towards the EU are f or the f irst t ime closely accompanied by increasing
distrust in national institutions, such as the government, parliament and polit ical parties (reaching by
autumn 2012, 91%, 89% and 94%, respectively). The crisis has clearly shaken Greek cit izens’ trust in the
EU and its institutions. The thought of  where those cit izens would turn to when they no longer trust any of
the f ormal polit ical channels of  representation at both the national and EU level opens up some worrying
and potentially dangerous possibilit ies f or the f uture.
On the more pressing matter of  speculation of  a disorderly Greek departure f rom the eurozone, we can
look at att itudes towards membership of  the single currency. 
Figure 2: Att itudes towards the single currency
Source: Eurobarometer surveys.
Figure 2 paints a dif f erent picture f rom that in Figure 1 and shows that, af ter a period of  declining support
in the euro in the years af ter its introduction, there has been a clear reaf f irmation of  Greek support f rom
2008 onwards. By 2011, posit ive attitudes towards the euro had returned to the very high levels of  the early
2000s, with an overwhelming 75 per cent of  Greeks in f avour compared to an EU average of  53 per cent. In
the context of  the unf olding economic crisis and sharply increased negative evaluations of  the EU, this
result init ially appears paradoxical. But it is consistent with an interpretation which distinguishes between
hard and sof t euroscepticism. It conf irms that Greek cit izens still very much want to be part of  the EU since
anything else is a much less attractive alternative and most importantly they want to have a say about what
kind of  EU they belong to. There is very clearly a crisis of  conf idence in the EU, which is no longer trusted
in Greece. However, this does not extend to rejection of  the EU. While the European Union is currently not
loved unconditionally, membership remains legit imate and Greeks are still willing to endure the austerity
measures in order to hold on to their EU status. What is uncertain is f or how long.
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